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The European conquest of Asia i s  one of t h e  major h i s t o r i c a l  
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movements of our  time. Pannikar c a l l s  t h i s  t h e  age of Vasco DaGama , . : y p  :.- , I  ( $ .  \ ! - # ; . .  - <-, != ,..:,.- . - 8  ? :' -' 
1 - "  " -  .=... :.,.; L,: <, 1 SkT:.i: c . ;  : ! :.L;c,>>c 
Par ry  w r i t e s  of  t h e  r i s e  of European hegemony2, and McNeill s e e s  if a s  
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p a r t  of an  even broader  h i s t o r i c a l  p rocess  t h a t  he  c a l l s  t h e  r i s e  of 
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t h e  west .  For a l l  observers  i t  was t r u l y  a  conquest ,  a  v i o l e n t  and 
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bloody s t r u g g l e  i n  which Europe gained t h e  ascendence through supe r io r  .... . . . . . . .  - :-.. ; :  . _ i  . . . i  . . - .<.  & ; x . .  :id:. , . i . ( . ,?. 2 1 z:.fi: :r,:. ;,:.:; i,,.::i 
m i l i t a r y  might.  
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The ins t ruments  of t h i s  conquest appear a t  . f i r s t  g l ance  t o  be  . ;... . .  . . .  . . - .  - L. - - -  . >. . . . . . . . .  . . -  . . i ' .  . ,  . . . .  . . . a  .; .: .' . L. .' , . - . . . . . . . . _ . .  
p r i m a r i l y  technologica l .  . Thus . Pannikar s e e s  t h e  dominance of Euro- 
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pean mari t ime powers over  land  masses of Asia  a s  a  c e n t r a l  un i fy ing  - .  .#,. : -.; < .: :. : 3.: j > ..! {,, : :. :.: : 2 .  .::: < ;;!, 2 ..;I: 2 ; : .! i:.; 3 :. 5.14 5;-: .:. 5: :? z: . . .  . . . .  . . . .: . 
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a b r d l l i ~ n t  l i t t l e  book, P ro fe s so r  C ipo l l a  i s  forced  a g a i n s t  . . h i s  own 
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. P a c i f i s t  . l e an ings  . and 1a.ndlegs t o  "recognize. . t h e  importance of . . .  .. 1 .  . ,  # .  , . . . .  
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115 'guns and s a i l s .  Par ry ,  too ,  g ives  s p e c i a l  weight  t o  c h a r t s ,  s h i p s  
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and guns i n  t h e  expansion. 
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Technology does no t  e x i s t  i n  a  s o c i a l  vacuum, however. The 
1 . I :  . : . . .  . . . . . .  . . . , . . 
l a r g e r  p a t t e r n  of European conquest d e f e a t ,  i l l u s t r a t e  t h a t  o t h e r  
. . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . - . .;: J ... . . - .  
c o n d i t i o n s  may w e l l  govern whether t echno log ica l  s u p e r i o r i t y  i s  d e c i s i v e  
* .  . - .  . . . .  1 . 1  : ' ' . ' . . . . . .  - ' { . . I . . ! .  
o r  impotent,  I n  1753 a t  P lassey  t h e  B r i t i s h  gene ra l  Cl ive  may w e l l  
. . . .  . . .  
have  "defeated" a n  army of 50,000 Ind ians  w i t h  a  f o r c e  l e s s  than  a  
. . L. .I 
t e n t h  t h a t  number, bu t  i n  1947 t e n s  of thousands of h igh ly  equipped 
. . i '3 
t r oops  f a c i n g  unarmed masses could not  b r i n g  peace o r  s t a b i l i t y  t o  
Q L 
. B r i t i s h  r u l e  i n  Ind ia .  Vietnam o f f e r s  a n  even more dramat ic  ca se  of 
.:., 
t h i s  r e v e r s a l .  I n  1875, 212 French could t a k e  t h e  c i t a d e l  a t  Hanoi, 
. . A -. 
b u t  i n  1954 100,000 could no t  hold i t .  And i n  t h e  1960's more than  
- - . - . . ' J L 8  
h a l f  a  m i l l i o n  American and a l l i e d  t roops  could not  main ta in  a  presence 
.. .a 
i n  Vietnam even w i t h  a  m f l f t a r y  technology t h a t  previous g e n e r a l s  would 
have found awesome i f  not unbelf evable .  
Dramatic a s  t h e s e  r e v e r s a l s  i n  t h e  power of technology may be,  
i t  is  p o s s i b l e  t o  s e e  them a s  only more extreme i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of a  
fundamental r u l e  i n  t h e  conquest of Asia .  The s o c i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n  
which a  technology emerges and ope ra t e s  i s  d e c i s i v e  i n  determining 
how potent  t h a t  technology w i l l  be .  This  i s  sca rce ly  a  novel observa- 
t i o n ,  t o  be  su re .  Pa r ry  s e e s  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  modern 
s t a t e ,  i n t e r l a c i n g  war a d  t r a d e  i n  c o n f l i c t  wi th  o the r  s t a t e s ,  as '  a  
key o rgan iza t iona l  element i n  t h e  expansion. McNeill a rgues  t h e  advan- 
t age  of t h e  West l a y  i n  t h e  combination of "Firm b e l i e f  i n  t h e i r  own 
i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  toge ther  w i th  burgeonfng numbers, t h e  wor ld ' s  most powerful 
weapons, and most e f f i c i e n t  network of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and communications. I17 
P a c ~ t  :.st i e a ~ ? i n g s  and iandlega co "L e ~ o g n l z z .  - t h e  Importancc, at 
It s t i l l  ~ e m a i n s ,  however, t o  understand t h e  d e t a i l s  of organ- 
guns and s a i l s  112 P z r r y ,  r so ,  g ives  s p e c r a l  w e ~ g h t  i f i  c h a r t s ,  s h i p s  
i z a t i o n  t h a t  were so  important  i n  t h e  conquest of Asia,  and t o  show t h a t  
and guns i n  t he  expansion. 
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t h e  sha rp  r e v e r s a l s  of t h e  r i s e  - and f a l l  of t h e  Vasco DaGama epoch i l l u s -  
Techn~ logy  does not  e x l s t  i n  a  s o c l a i  vacuum, however. The 
t r a t e  common r a t h e r  t h a n  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  o rgan iza t iona l  r u l e s .  Th i s  i s  
l a r g e r  p a t t e r n  of  European conquest 2nd d e f s a t ,  l l l u s t r a c e  cha t  ocher  
t he  c e n t r a l  t a s k  of t h i s  essay .  It c o n s t i t u t e s  i n  a  sense  a n  a t tempt  
conditxons may we l l  govern whether technologlza i  supe r lo r l cy  1s d e z i s i v e  
t o  move from t h e  microprocesses  of b a t t l e f i e l d  organiza t ion .  t o  t h e  
o r  impotent In  1753 a t  P ~ a s s e y  t h e  B Y I . I I % ~ ~  genera l  C i l ~ e  may w e l l  
macroprocesses of h i s t o r i c a l  movements. t 
5ave "defeated" a n  army of 50,000 I n d l a n ~  w;ih a E O L L C  l e s s  rhan ;. 
The o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  d e t a i l s  of t h e  conquest s tand  out  i n  s t rong-  
' I E C K ~  t h a r  number, but 1i-i 1347 t e n s  .if ;hcusinLs .: : . . ~ ~ ; h i y  .-.quipped 
e s t  r e l i e f  when we cons ide r  t h e  t a s k  of e s t a b l i s h i n g  c o n t r o l  over  land .  
L ~ ~ o p s  facrng  unarn~ed masses could nor br lng  peaz.e or  s t a b i l l r y  to 
This  t a s k  was begun i n  e a r n e s t  on ly  i n  t h e  middle of t h e  1 8 t h  century ,  
3 r l t l a h  r u l e  I n  India- Vietnam c f f  e rs  ,n E - G . ~  r cxe  dra imciz  case of 
and continued t o  t h e  end of t h e  19 th  century.  For t h e  f i r s t  two t o  
t h i s  r e v e r s a l .  I n  1875, 212 Frenzh conid cake r h e  c i t a d e l  ar  Hanol, 
t h r e e  c e n t u r i e s  of European expansion, however, i t  is  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  
~ u t  i n 1954 i00,000 could nos hoid L L .  And I n  rhe 1960 's  mare than  
supe r io r  maritime technology of t h e  West was t h e  c r u c i a l  element, and 
SalT a m i l l i o n  American and a l l r e d  t r3ops  couid not malntAln a  p re sen re  
i t  w i l l  b e  u s e f u l  t o  review t h i s  per iod b r i e f l y .  
.Portuge,se,and-Spanish and then  Dutch' and Eng l i sh . incu r s ions  
i n  Asia-  came f i r s t  i n  t h e  form of powerful.  new s h i p s  ca r ry ing  heavy . 
guns. Whether t h e  Europeans met t h e  weak r e s i s t a n c e  ,of .-the -Southeas t  - , 
Asian s u l t a n s .  o r  : t he  .power£ u l  land-based p r i n c e s  of - I n d i a ,  :.it& was t h e  . : - .  
g r e a t  technologica l  s u p e r i o r i t y  o f . t h e . f l e e t  t h a t  provided theLinroads. .  - -, 
'*:. The maritime empires of Southeast  .Asia could of . fer  . l i t t l e  r e s i s -  . 
. I .  tance,  and , . the i r  t r a d e  p a t t e r n s  were broken up and dominated by t h e  - .-. . . 
West, I n  I n d i a  t h e  Por tugese  capac i ty  t o  hold  t h e  f o r t i f i c a t i o n  a t .  . . .  
Diu, a  capac i ty  .based on mari t ime s u p e r i o r i t y .  a lone ,  led, t h e  g r e a t  
Akbar t o  e s t a b l i s h  peace£ u l  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  them a f t e r  . h i s   conquest . 
of Gujera t  i n  1512-3. And . l a t e r  i n  1616 t h e  p l an  t o - u s e  demonstrated.  
B r i t i s h  naval  . supe r io r&ty  laga ins t  t h e  ~Por tugese .  and o t h e r  enemies -*led : - ,' 
t h e  Moghul Emperor t o  -gran t  res idence  and . t r a d i n g  , p r iv i l edges   to t h e  . . 
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B r i t i s h  i n  Sura t .  Western maritime t echno log ica l  s u p e r i o r i t y  was novel-. - - '  
and d e c i s i v e ,  i n  . e s t ab l i sh i . ng  t h e  i n i t i a l  presence.  ... . . . . 
.The t echnologica l  advances underlying Western s u p e r i o r i t y  + , .  . . . 
were by no means t r i v i a l . .  A s  P ro fe s so r  C ipo l l a  argues,  i n  s h i f t i n g  
wholeheartedly t o  t h e  gun c a r r y i n g  s a i l i n g  s h i p ,  exchanging oarsmen 
f o r  s a i l s  and war r io r s  f o r  guns, t h e  At lan t ic .  peoples broke  t h e  b o t t l e - .  
neck of human energy and harnessed massive power sources  f o r  t h e i r  
9 
a c t i v i t . i e s ,  But i t  i s  a l s o  important  t o  no te  t h a t  t hese  t echno log ica l .  
advances were made i n  t h e  l e s s e r  European s t a t e s ,  who were a l s o  making 
massive s o c i a l  innovat ions  i n  p o l i t i c a l ,  m i l i t a r y  and economic organiza- 
t i o n .  These were t h e  s t a t e s  who pioneered t h e  c e n t r a l i z e d  administra-  r .  
t i v e  systems, s t and ing  armies and j o i n t  s t o c k  companies t h a t  were t h e  
o rgan iza t iona l  c a r r i e r s  of Western expansion. 
From ' t h e  middble .of t h e  18 t h  century  .maritime ctechnology-looses 
i t s  exc lus ive  i n t e r e s t ,  however and i t  i s  t h e  land wars t h a t  a t t r a c t s  : - / *  $ 1  r 
our  a t t e n t i o n .  1 The -maritime .technology e s t a b l i s h e d  Western dominance - = 
over t r a d e  networks: ' '.sea l a n e s  and p o r t s .  Landrwars were . requi red  t o  - ; 
e s t a b l 5 s h  modern c o l o n i a l  con t ro l .  The most dramat ic  of t hese -war s ,  . . a  - 
of course,  involved t h e  massive conquest o f .  Ind ia .  But t h e r e  were, l and  
wars a s  w e l l  i n  Southeast  Asia,  a n d - i n  a l l  of t h e s e  we-can : see . the  
common thread  of t h e  d e c i s i v e  power-of o r g a n i z a t i o n . - .  . a  - , . , 
J u s t  a s  iri t h e  g r e a t  r e v e r s a l s  noted e a r l i e r ,  t h e  r a t i o  of --
combatants o f f e r s , t h e + m o s t  ~ d r a m a t i c  index  of o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  d e t a i l ,  , . 
and r a i s e s  the .  ques t ions  t o  which t h i s  e s say  i s  addressed.  ,.How could A .. 
a B r i t i s h  f o r c e  of t h r e e  thousand d e c i s i v e l y  d e f e a t v a n  Ind ian  f o r c e 1  , . 
of perhaps 50,000? How could t h e  r e l a t i v e l y . ~ s m a l l  .European f o r c e s ,  .: :. 
f o r e i g n  t roops  f a r  from home, g a i n  ascendance o v e r . t h e  .masses.of n a t i v e  - ' 
t roops  t h a t  a  t y p i c a l  l o c a l  r u l e r  could muster?  The r e a l l y  remarkable 
a s p e c t  of t h e  European conquest of t h e  Asian land mass i s  t h a t  i t  was 
accomplished by small  numbers of t roops .  And why could not  much l a r g e r  
bod ie s  of European t roops  hold t h a t  land  mass a  century l a t e r  a g a i n s t  
, o f t e n  numerically i n f e r i o r  f o r c e s ?  Thus t h e  r a t i o  of combatants provides  . --
t h e  index t h a t  g ives  drama t o  t h e  ques t ion  of t h e  r i s e  and f a l l  of t h e  
Vasco DaGama epoch. 
Combatant r a t i o s  a r e  no to r ious ly  s l i p p e r y  q u a n t i t a t i v e  measures. ' .  
The body counts  and muster r o l e s  of l a t e  " imper i a l i s t "  wars of t h e  mid- 
twen t i e th  century  g ive  t h e  modern observer  cause f o r  more than  a  l i t t l e  # 
scept ic i sm,  And i n  any epoch campaign successes  repor ted  by s o l d i e r s  
f a r  from home may be expected t o  show a c e r t a i n  exaggerat ion.  To add 
f u r t h e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  t h e  campaigns of t h e  Asian conquest a r e  s t i l l  
- 5 -  
l a r g e l y  documented and a v a i l a b l e  only from t h e  eyes of t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  
commanders. Nonetheless ,  even i f  we t ake  a  l a r g e  measure of exaggera- 
t i o n  a s  t h e  cons t an t ,  we no te  a  d i s t i n c t . h i s t o r i c a 1  t r end  i n  t h e  r e p o r t s  
of combatant r a t i o s . ,  It i s  t h e  l a r g e  h i s t o r i c a l  changes i n  t h e  r a t i o s ,  
r a t h e r  t han  t h e  s p e c i f i c  numbers of any campaign, t h a t  mark our  u s e  of 
them. Here t h e  exaggera t ions  and e r r o r s  of t h e  f i e l d  a r e  l e s s  t rouble-  
some * 
We begin  wi th  I n d i a ,  where t h e  s t r u g g l e  i s  most f u l l y  documented 
and t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  t r e n d s  a r e  c l e a r e s t .  Combatant r a t i o s  f o r  I n d i a  
and Burma a r e  shown i n  F igure  1, a c t u a l  t roops  numbers a r e  shown i n  
Figure 2. 
The f i r s t  l and  wars .of  imperial ism i n  I n d i a  were ~ r i ' m a r i l ~  be-
tween t h e  French and B r i t i s h .  These two were ex t ens ive ly  involved i n  
c o l o n i a l  s t r u g g l e s  i n  North America a s  w e l l  and t h e  . s t r u g g l e s  had t h e i r  
coun te rpa r t  i n  Europe. The dea th  of Aurangzeb and t h e  d e c l i n e  of t h e  
Moghul Empire brought a  power vacuum t h a t  implied i n e v i t a b l e  c o n f l i c t  
between t h e  European f o r c e s  involved i n  Ind ia .  War i n '  Europe: marked 
only t h e  formal  commencement and c e s s a t i o n  of h o s t i l i t i e s  and t h e  for -  
mal r e s o l u t i o n  of t h e  c o n f l i c t  i n  Ind ia .  The per iod  cqvered t h e  yea r s  
1746-63, and coincided wi th  the  European War of Aus t r ian  Succession 
(1746-48) and t h e  Seven Years War (1756-63). The French u l t i m a t e l y  
l o s t  t h e  o v e r a l l  c o n f l i c t  and were confined t o  a  sma l l  p o l i c e  f o r c e  
i n  Pondicherry. Here B r i t i s h  maritime s u p e r i o r i t y  was important  i n  
c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  sea  l a n e s  by which French and B r i t i s h  p o s i t i o n s  were 
suppl ied .  What is  most important  i n  t h i s  c o n f l i c t ,  however i s  i t s  
s t r u c t u r e  a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  numbers of t roops .  
.War ok the .Aus t r i a~ .SuccessZon  
, Seven Years War 
BOn$est of Bengal ,. 
". 
Thfrd Mysore War * 
Fourth ~ ~ s o d e  War 
I Second Mahrat ta  War 
i" . I Gurkh War 
I Third Mahratta War r, 
IQ Second Afgan War 
F i r s t  
P Third Burmese 'War 
. .  Bhurtpore 
Gwalior 
~ikh'war 0 
secondQ Sec d Burmese War 
Sikh War '2P 
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By t h e  s t anda rds  of contemporary Europe t h e  c o n f l i c t  i n  I n d i a  
involved no more than  a  s e r i e s  o f  skf -mishes ,  For any campaign t h e  
, 
number of Europeans involved r a r e l y  exceeded 1,000, w i th  t h e  l a r g e s t  
b a t t l e s  contes ted  by 8,000, Fur ther  t h e  r a t i o s  of combatants u sua l ly  
approximated u n i t y ,  
One campaign from t h e  War of Aus t r ian  Succession can s e r v e  a s  
an example of t h e s e  e a r l y  c o n f l i c t s ,  I n  1746 t h e  French made an  a l l i a n c e  
wi th  t h e  Nabob of t h e  Ca rna t i c  whose t e r r i t o r y  Included Pondicherry,  
wi th  a  Freneh f a c t o r y ,  and Madras wfth a n  English f a c t o r y .  Through 
French in f luence  t h e  Nabob forbade t h e  Englfsh t o  a t t a c k  any French 
ga r r i sons  loca t ed  i n  h i s  t e r r i t o r y ,  Thus, t h e  Engl i sh  f l e e t  which had 
s a i l e d  f o r  Pondicherry, was forced t o  r e t l r e  t o  Ceylon. This  l e f t  
che French pos i  t i o n  unhampered and DupPeix, che French commander 
a t tacked  Madras w i th  1,100 Europeans, 400 t r a i n e d  Sepoys and a  f l e e t  
of e i g h t  s h i p s ,  The 200 man Engiish g a r r i s o n  was g r e a t l y  outnumbered 
and Madras f e l l  e a s i l y  t o  t h e  French. The Nabob s e n t  a  p u n i t i v e  f o r c e  
aga insc  che French f o r  t h i s  untrammeled aggress ion ,  b u t  t h e  French b e a t  
back t h e  nabob's f o r c e s .  lo The French then  turned t o  a t t a c k  For t  S a i n t  
David, bu t  by t h i s  t ime English reinforcements  of 4,000 men had a r r i v e d  
and t h e  French a t t a c k  f a i l e d .  The French f e l l  back and were i n  t u r n  
besieged i n  t h e i r  c a p i t a l  of Pondicherry. The B r i t i s h  s i e g e  l a s t e d  
t h r e e  months, was very  u n s k i l l f u l l y  managed, and ended when t h e  r a i n s  
forced t h e  B r i t i s h  t o  withdraw. By t h e  next  dry  season,  1'748, Europe 
was ' a t  peace, Dipect h o s t i l i t i e s  i n  I n d i a  were h a l t e d  and Madras was 
re turned  t o  t h e  English.  
This  c o n f l i c t  t y p i f i e s  t he  wars t h a t  continued f o r  about two 
decades through t h e  i n t e r i m  period of European peace and t h e  Seven 
Years War (1757-1761), A l i i ances ,  counter  a l l i a n c e s ,  s2 iges  and t r eache ry  
i n  t h e  f a c e  of s h i f t i n g  advantages were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h i s  c o n f l i c t .  
It i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  of  combatants f o r  a l l  t h e s e  B r i t i s h -  
French campaigns averaged about 1 t o  1, Large imbalances t y p i c a l l y  
. 
brought v i c t o r y  t o  t h e  numerical ly  s u p e r i o r  fo rce .  
Two decades of c o n f l i c t  l e f t  I n d i a  l a r g e l y  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  a s  
France s u f f e r e d  l o s s e s  i n  Asia ,  North America and Europe. A t  t h i s  
po in t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r d  t h e  c o n f l i c t  changed d rama t i ca l ly .  The B r i t i s h  
began campaigns t o  ga in  c o n t r o l  over land ,  and t h e  d i sp l aced  French 
s o l d i e r y  o f t e n  s o l d  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s  t o  I n d i a n  p r i n c e s ,  When t h e  Euro- 
peans fought  one another ,  w i th  t h e  m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  developed i n  . 
Europe, t roop  numbers were smal l  and t h e  contenders  were u s u a l l y  of 
approximately equal  s t r e n g t h .  When t h e  B r i t i s h  began campaigns a g a i n s t  
I n d i a n  armies,  t h e i r  t roop  numbers r m a i n e d  smal l  a t  f i r s t  and grew 
s t e a d i l y  dur ing  t h e  fol lowing cen tu ry ,  Combatant r a t i o s ,  however, were 
heav i ly  unbalanced a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h ,  But i n  t h e s e  b a t t l e s  numerical: 
i n f e r i o r i t y  w a s  not a  s e r i o u s  disadvantage.  The B a t t l e  of P l a s sey  
was t h e  f i r s t  of t h i s  new period of c o n f l i c t .  
I n  May 1756, t h e  Nabob of Bengal made t h e  f i r s t  move by march- 
i ng  wi th  his army of 50,000 horsemen, o b l i t e r a t i n g  s e v e r a l  smal l  B r i t i s h  
g a r r i s o n s  and s e i z i n g  Ca lcu t t a .  A s  .an answer t o  t h i s  a  B r i t i s h  f o r c e  
of  800 Europeans and 1,500 Sepoys w a s . s e n t  from Madras, which, wi th  
re inforcements ,  t o t a l l e d  3,500, M t e r  a  b r i e f  b a t t l e  t h a t  blocked t h e  
advance t o  Ca lcu t t a ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  s u c c e s s f u l l y  re-occupied t h e  c i t y ,  
and cont inued i n  p u r s u i t  of t h e i r  enemy, On t h e  23rd of June, t h e  
B r i t i s h  under C l i v e  were drawn up w i t h  about  3,000 men a t  P lassey  i n  
t h e  f a c e  of t h e  t o t a l  50,000 man n a t i v e  cava l ry  under s i raj-ud-daula.  
The day was spent  i n  r e t u r n s  of cannon f i r e  from one p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  
o t h e r .  No hand t o  hand combat had been engaged i n  and no' charges had 
been made, A t  about two o ' c lock  t h e  Nabob ". . . s en t  word t o  t h e  sma l l  , . ,, 
parey of Frenchmen w i t h  him t h a t  he  was be t rayed ,  t h a t  t h e  b a t t l e  was 
l o s t ,  and cha t  they should save  themselves; i & e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  t h i s  h e  
f l e d  on a  s w i f t  camel and himself  brought  t 6  Mushdabad t h e  news of h i s  
over throw , "11 With t h i s  t h e  Bengalese army was d i spe r sed  e a s i l y  by t h e  
B r i t i s h  and t h e  b a t t l e  was won t h a t  a f t e rnoon ,  The I n d i a n  p r ince ,  
Siraj-ud-daula,  even tua l ly  met a  v i o l e n t  dea th  a t  t h e  hands o f . h i s  own 
gene ra l s ,  
. . . -,
This  I n d i a n  d e f e a t  p u t s  i n t o  bold  r e l i e f  s e v e r a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
d e f e c t s  i n  t h e  I n d i a n  system, A l l  i n d i c a t i o n s  po in t  t o  t h e  organiza-  
t i o n a l  v a r i a b l e  s i n c e  we know t h a t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  Bengalese army was 
equipped w i t h  adequate  a r t i l l e r y ,  mention i s  made of t h e  "cannonade 
opened by t h e  enemy. "12 An examination of  t h e  o rgan iza t ion  of t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  Moghul army i s  u s e f u l  here .  
The t r a d i t i o n a l  Moghul army was organized on t h e  mansab system, 
h 
a  form of f e u d a l  m i l i t a r y  o rgan iza t ion .  A r i c h ,  OF upper c a s t e  man 
I 
would a t t a c h  t o  himself  as many men a s  h e  could, and would b e  ass igned  
a  r ank  commensurate w i t h  t h i s  number, The g r e a t e s t  c h i e f ,  i n  whose 
i n t e r e s t  t h e  war was be ing  fought ,  would pay t h o s e  sub-chiefs  a  f i x e d  
f e e  f o r  t h e  use  of t h e s e  t roops ,  Af t e r  t ak ing  a  l a r g e  sha re ,  t h e  sub- 
ch i e f  would pay h i s  men from t h e  remainder, These va r ious  sub-groups 
1 
owed no r e a l  a l l e g i a n c e  t o  t h e  main o r g a n i z a t i o n  o r  t o  t h e  goa l s  and 
purposes of t h e  o rgan iza t ion ,  and only  a  nominal a l l e g i a n c e  t o  t h e  
commander-in-chief . I r v i n e  no te s ,  "But from t h e  h i g h e s t  t o  t h e  lowest  
rank, t h e  o f f i c e r  o r  s o l d i e r  looked t o  h i s  *mediate l e a d e r  and followed 
h i s  f o r t u n e s  s tuyd ing  h i s  i n t e r e s t s  r a t h e r  t han  those  of t h e  army a s  a  
whole. 111 3 
This f e u d a l  m i l i t a r y  o rgan iza t ion  produced a  h i g h l y  f r a g i l e  
s t r u c t u r e ,  It was marked by an i n o r d i n a t e  dependence f o r  t h e  continua- 
t i o n  of b a t t l e  upon t h e  v i s i b l e  presence  of t h e  commander i n  c h i e f .  
To i n c r e a s e  t h e  f r a g i l i t y ,  t h e  personal  q u a l i t y  of l e a d e r s h i p  usua l ly  
\ 
implied no o r d e r l y  p l a n  of succession.  Thus if t h e  Nabob himself were 
k i l l e d  o r  i f  h e  f l e d ,  t h e  e n t i r e  s t r u c t u r e  would d i s s o l v e .  Thus a t  
P lassey  when t h e  Nabob f l e d  on a  s w i f t  camel, t h e  t roops  melted away. 
A contemporary observer  commented: "Nothfng was more 'common than  f o r  
t h e  whole army t o  t u r n  i t s  back t h e  moment they  perceived t h e  g e n e r a l ' s  
s e a t  empty, But Europeans t h e s e  f o r t y  yea r s  p a s t  (1745-85)) gained many 
. a b a t t l e  by po in t ing  a four-pounder a t  t h e  main e l ephan t ,  Ind ian  gene ra l s  
have abandoned t h e  custom and now appear on horseback, nay have learned  
t o  d i s c i p l i n e  t h e i r  t roops  and t o  have a r t i l l a r y  w e l l  se rved .  ,114 
A b u r e a u c r a t i c  a c t i o n  t y p i c a l  of t h e  B r i t i s h  s t a n d s  i n  marked 
c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  f r a g i l e  Ind ian  s t r u c t u r e .  A t  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s e i z u r e  of 
Calcu t ta  preceeding Plassey ,  t h e  B r i t i s h  governor,  commandant and 
s e v e r a l  s e n i o r  members of counci l  dese r t ed  by s h i p  down r i v e r .  Immediately 
one of t h e  jun io r  members of counci l  assumed c o n t r o l .  
. Another g r e a t  o rgan iza t iona l  f law commented on by many 18 th  
Century observers  was t h e  complete l a c k  of o rde r  and d i s c i p l i n e  wi th  
which t h e  Ind ian  armies fought ,  I r v i n e  observed: "According t o  our  
European not ions ,  d i s c i p l i n e  was extremely l ax ,  i f  no t  e n t i r e l y  absent  
. . .when once t h e  army was thrown i n t o  confusion i t  was impossible  
t o  r e s t o r e  a  Moghul army's d i s c i p l i n e ,  wh i l e  dur ing  t h e  march they  
f 
. - 
moved wi thout  order ,  w i th  t he  i r r e g u l a r i t y  of a  herd  of animals.  1115 
In refefence to t.he infantry (of which there was actually 
1ittle.h an Indian army) Irvine quotes a contemporary of Clive, 
"Another observer, Orme, ... says the infantry consisted of a multi- 
tude of people assembled together without regard to rank or file; 
some with swords and targets, who could never stand the shock of a 
body of horse; some bearing matchlocks, which in the best of order 
can produce but .very uncertain fire. In short the infantry were more 
a rabble of half armed men than anything else. ,116 
Irvine quotes another author, Fitzclarance, who describes an 
Indian infantry charge on the 26th of November, 1817: "Their manner 
of advancing was exceedingly imposing. Being perfectly undisciplined, 
they advanced in a crowd; the bravest being in advance and taking high 
bounds and turning the sound of small drums,'accompanied by the perpetual 
;J7 vociferation of the war-cry "Din! Din! ~uhammad. 
This same disorganized method of attack was practiced by the 
cavalry as well, "...whosoever had seen a body of ten thousand horse 
advancing on the full gallop all together wfll acknowledge ... 
that their appearance is rremendous, be their courage or 
discipline what it wfll ...y et a few European squadrons 
I 
could ride them down and disperse them. There was a want of 
sympathy between the parts, and this prevented one part 
,I 
depending upon the assistance of.another. Owing to its size, 
I -  
an army of Moghul horse could, for the moment, meet the attack 
1: !. :, of a small compact body by a portion only of its total strength, 
and since as against disciplined cavalry, an equal front of an 
irregular body of troops can never stand the shock of an attack, 
the Moghuls were bound to give way. The whole being thus broken 
up into parts, the parts avoided exposure to the brunt 
of the action; the part actually attacked fled, but the 
parts not menaced did not combine to fall on the rear 
of the pursuers. On the other hand, the disciplined 
troops divided, reassembled, charged and halted on a 
singled part in turn. But if the drilled cavalry tried 
skirmishing, it was soon found that the Moghul horse, 
apparently ,so despicable, were, most formidable in detail. 
In single combat a European seldom equalled the address 
of an (individual) native horseman. ,118 
This general 1ack.of organization was not restricted merely to 
battle techniques. Neither the army, nor the individual groups within 
it, practiced or drilled in combined movements of any sort. A contem- 
porary English visitor to a Moghul army camp in 1791 observed, "The 
traces of order, discipline, and science are so faint as to be scarcely 
discernable, except in the outward appearance of the men, the manage- 
ment of their horses, and their dexterity in the use of the spear and 
sabre, which individually gives a martial air, 149 
There was one further aspecL of organizational disadvantage. 
Each individual soldier owned his own horse. His pay was determined by 
the quality of that animal. If a man's horse were killed he was ruined 
irretrievably. Since the Nabob would not make good the loss, with the 
loss of his horse the soldier lost his entire allowance. -Such a system 
discouraged a soldier from taking risks and encouraged cavairy to avoid 
the heart of the battle. 
The third division of the army, the artillery, was also plagued 
by the same organizational impediments. X0ber.t Orme., an Englishman 
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living in 1ndia.in l746, has left us his observations of the artillery 
of the Nabobof.the.Carnatic. "Having never experienced the effect of 
field pieces, they.had no conception that it was possible.to fire with 
execution the same-piece of cannon five or six times in a minute; for 
in the awkward management of their awn clumsy~artillery, they think 
they do well if they fire once in a quarter.of an hour." An account 
of the Mahrattas in 1791 shows this same inability to use the.weapons 
to their full advantage. "A gun is loaded, and the whole people in 
the battery sit down, talk and smoke for an hour, when it is fired, 
and if it knocks up a great dust', it is.though&sufficfent: it is 
reloaded and the parties resume cheir smoking and conversation. 
During two hours in the middle of the day, generally from one to 
three a gun is seldom fired on either side, that time being as it 
would appear,'by mutual consent set aside for meals. "*' For Turkish . . , 
and Asian armies:the gun technology was employed'tactically as a 
siege weapon. It was the.Europeans who pioneered in lighter guns for 
field operations. j . . 
Pannikar considers Plassey not a battle but a transaction. 21. 
It was a transaction characterisric of the decline of the Moghuls and 
the rise of the.Englfsh. .Non-muslim entrepreneurial groups rose in 
the transformation of the Indian economy froq an aglarian to a commer- 
cial base in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries. The entrepre- . 
neurial groups ,worked to undermine Moghul power in India, just as the 
burghers in Europe allied with Kings to undepine the power of a 
landed aristocracy. But whereas the burgher? had often gone to battle 
against the landed knights, the entrepreneurial class in India had 
the Company as a major.fighcing ally. India was sold out to the East 
India company to gain the ascendence of a capitalist class. 
It is crue that Plassey was noc a pitched bactle stubbo.mly 
fought. It did not provide the rhetoric by which heroic.battZes are 
described. But it was noc anomalous. for this, On the contrary, how- 
ever unusual was the structure of the Batcle of Plassey, with its 
. 
small contingent of British and British trained sepoys facing and sub- 
duing ten times their number of fierce Indian troops, it was the structure 
that marked batt.les in the conquest of India for the next half century. 
The first two Mysore wars (1767-69 and 1780-84) and the first of-the 
Mahratta Wars (1774-82) all show combatant ratios in which the British 
face Indian forces about 10 times their own strength. 
In all of these cases it was noc the lack of'modern technology 
nor the treachery of che rising non-Muslim entrepreneurial class that 
proved decisive. It was the European military organization that won 
over tradi~ional Indian armies. What proved decisive for the British 
was the capacity of the infantry to hold their ranks and return the 
fire, of the calvary to charge, halt, reassemble and turn at a single 
point, of the artillery to fire field piwes in concert and with great 
accuracy five or six times a minute. Behind this capacity lay the 
impersonal bureaucratic organizarion that had been evolving in European 
military arrangements over the past two to three centuries. So long 
as the bureaucratized, rationally organized British militqry faced the 
traditional military of the lndian princes, combatant ratios could 
remain highly unbalanced without adverse effect upon the foreigners. 
In this period it was not simply "getting their fustest with th' mostest" 
that counted; it was organization thac counted. 
Like t h e  gun technology, which had a l r eady  been acqui red  by 
t h e  Indian p r i n c e s ,  rhe o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e s  could a l s o  be acqui red .  
I n  some r e s p e c t s  t h i s  was r e l a t i v e l y  easy ,  since t h e  French f a i l u r e  threw 
onto t h e  subcontinent  a ready supply of personnel  experienced i n  t hose  
p r i n c i p l e s .  Indian p r i n c e s  o f t e n  took rhe  French i n r o  t h e i r  s e r v i c e  
f o r  t he  e x p l i c i t  purpose of reorganiz ing  and modernizing t h e i r  armies.  
The course of t h e  Mysore wars i l l u s r r a t e s  how t h i s  change i n  organiza-  
t i o n  a f f e c t e d  che course  of t h e  c o n f l i c t  and i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  combatant 
r a t i o s .  
The f i r s t  Mysore wa* involved about 10,000 B r i t i s h  a g a i n s t  
about 70,000 t roops  of Hyder A l i ,  l a s t e d  almost twd yea r s  and ended i n  
something of a s ta lemate .  A decade l a r e r  rhe Second Mysore war involved 
11-15,000 B r i t i s h  a g a i n s t  even heav ie r  odds, perhaps 90,000 Ind ian  
t roops .  Of these ,  however, 1,500 were French t r a i n e d  and 400 were French. 
The war dragged on f o r  f o u r  yea r s  and a l s o  ended i n d e c i s i v e l y .  By t h e  
t h i r d  Mysore war, i n  1790, t h e  Indian  army was more f u l l y  Europeanized 
and requi red  on t h e  Briizish s i d e  some 50,000 t roops ,  t h e  l a r g e s t  f o r c e  
they had y e t  f i e l d e d  i n  Ind ia .  The f o u r t h  and f i n a l  Mysore war 
requi red  roughly s i m i l a r  l e v e l s  of B r i t i s h  m i l i t a r y .  The r e s p e c t i v e  
combatant r a e i o s  f o r  t h e  f o u r  wars was 1:7,  1:12, 1 :2 .5 , -1 :1 .2 .  
Contemporary accounts  show some of t h e  d e t a i l  of t h e  new 
2 2 
Europeanized o rgan iza t ion .  Hyder A l i  impressed fo re ign  obse rve r s  
i n  1781 by marching h i s  f o r c e s  one hundred mi les  i n  two days and a 
h a l f .  H i s  successor  Tipu Su l t an  marched h i s  e n t i r e  army 63  miles  
i n  two days i n  1790. These were considered f e a t s  a s  wounderful a s  
those  accomplished by B r i t i s h  f o r c e s .  A 1 1  of t h e s e  marches were 
noted f o r  being a t y p i c a l  of Indian  m i l i t a r y  behavior .  
The Mahratta wars illustrate another aspect of the organiza- 
tional diffusion chat was changing combatant ratios at this time. 
The new military organiza~ion demanded in India as it.had in Europe, 
a la,rger trans.fomation in the political structure. The limits of 
political transformarion placed limits upon the successful adoption 
of a new military organization. 
The first Mahratta war.belongs clearly in-a class with Plassey 
and the firsr Mysore war. After this the Mahratta rulers began to 
use the French extensively. One of the first in their service, de 
Boigne, raised a force of 1,700 that p.roved so sueeessful against 
native enemies that he was asked in 1790 to raise the force to 
"thirteen battalions of infantry with calvary and artillary, and 
later to three brigades of 18,000 regular infantry, 6,000 irregulars, 
2,000 irregular horse, 600 Afghan cavalry and 2,000 guns. ,123 
The mansab system was replaced with a highly centralized 
military organization in which the prince raised the entire force at 
his own expense. This avoided the fatal fractionated character of 
the traditional armies and gave great advantage to the Mahratta ruler. 
Bur it also made heavy, and as it rurned out impossible demands on 
the entire political system. The cost of raising a centralized army 
dictared the sequestering of.feudal estates, Jagtrs, strongly reminis- 
cent in both mocivation and process of the rise of central states and 
bureaucracies in Wesrern Europe. Such centralization weakened the 
political system internally by alienating powerful local leaders. 24 
In addition, the external thrusts from Afghanistan placed further 
intolerable burdens on the system and the British eventually produced 
its forceful dissolurion. 
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Even with all these difficulties, however, the Mahratta 
adoption of rhe European military organization in the field produced 
a formidable foe, The second and third Mahratta wars saw combatant 
ratfos approaching unfry and forced the British to field first 
50,000 then over 100,000 troops. These wars also involved some of 
the most desperare fighring yet encountered in 1ndia.15 A descrip- 
tion of the Second Mahracta war can serve co illustrate both the 
eomplicaced and the desperate nature of this type of conflict. 
War was declared in August 1803, and the two British armies, 
one from the north and the other from the south were sent out against 
the enemy. Subsidiary operations were to be carried out by smaller 
armies on the flanks of these main offensives. The Northern opera- 
tion had a total of 21,000 men, rhe southern army consisted of 20,000 
men for the main army and a subsidiary force of 4,000. The total 
British force then was something around 50,000 men. This was the 
largest British force that had been fielded up to that time. They 
faced several Indian armies totalling some 100,000 men. 
26 
The course of the war is very complicated: a total of 21 
separace battles was fought over a period from August 1803 to 
December 1805, The entire force on either side was never completely 
assembled in one place, because rhe war occurred in more than one 
rhearre of operation. The firsr major battle was fought at Asseye. 
Parc of the Brirish army from the south, consisting of about 6,000 
men with 14 guns, faced a Mahracca host of 18,000 men trained by the 
French, and 15,000 to 20,000 i.rr,egular cavalry, with 100 guns. The 
British put the Mahrattas to flight but only with a severe loss of. 
over 2,000 men. On the 29th of November another action was fought 
with  a  p a r t i a l  B r i t i s h  v i c t o r y .  The e a r l y  p a r t  of t h e  b a t t l e  was 
dominated by t h e  I n d i a n ' s  e f f e c t i v e  use  of t h e l r  heavy b a c t e r i e s ,  
alchough t h e  B r i t i s h  u l t i m a t e l y  managed t o  c a p t u r e  38 guns, On t h e  
15 th  of December t h e  f o r t r e s s  of Gwalighur was taken.  D u r n g  t h e s e  
ope ra t i ons  s e v e r a l  E.rench o f f i c e r s  and non-commissioned o f f i c e r s  
surrendered.  Some French had been found among t h e  dead a f t e r  s e v e r a l  
engagements. One ou t s t and ing  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of t h e s e  b a t t l e s  of 
Assaye, Argaum, Aseergurh and Gwalighur was cha t  they  were a l l  opera- 
c ions  of unusual  s e v e r i t y .  one au thor  desc r ibed  t h e  b a t t l e  of Assaye 
t o  be a s  "despera te  a s  any i n  ou r  h i s to . ry  ... t h e  c a s u a l i t i e s  were a s  
heavy . a s  any o t h e r  on t h e  record .  1127 
Meanwhile, t h e  n o r t h e r n  army f i r s t  stormed t h e  f o r t r e s s  of 
Al igarh ,  and then  w i t h  4,500 men a t t acked  19,000 Mahra t tas ,  who were 
l e d  by a  Frenchman, M. Perron.  The B r i t i s h  de fea t ed  t h e  Mahra t tas  
w i th  g r e a t  l o s s  and caprured  281 guns. A t  t h i s  p o i n t  t h e  French 
gene ra l  and some of h i s  o f f i c e r s  sur rendered  themselves.  The t o t a l  
number of Ind i an  f o r c e s  i n  t h i s  Northern campaign was 43,000 men and 
464 guns, The t o t a l  B r i t i s h  was 21,000 men. 
A f t e r  A l iga rh  t h e  B r i t i s h  marched t o  Delh i  where chey m e t  t h e  
main p o r t i o n  of t h e  army of S indhia ,  about 20,000 men. The B r i t i s h  
aga in  forced  t h e  enemy from t h e  f i e l d ,  c ap tu r ing  63 guns, buc aga in  
on ly  w i th  s eve re  l o s s e s  i n  t h e  f a c e  of Mahrat ta  a r t i l l e r y  f i r e .  The 
B r i t i s h  then advanced t o  Agra, which was taken  wi th  t h e  cap tu re  of 
a  foundry, run by a Scotchman, t h a t  suppl ied  che Mahrat tas  numerous 
guns. 
Ar Laswari one Br' icish b a t t a l i o n  and f o u r  Sepoy b a t t a l i o n s  
w i th  one B r i c i s h  regiment of ho r se ,  m e t  an army of 14,000 Mahra t tas ,  
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c o n s i s t i n g  of 1 7  t r a i n e d  i n f a n t r y  b a t t a l i o n s ,  4,000 o r  5,000 ho r ses  
and 72 guns. A t  t h e  c l o s e  of t h e  combat, a l l  t h a t  remained of t h e  
17 b a t t a l i o n s  was 2,000 p r i s o n e r s  wi th  every  one of t h e  7 1  guns captured ,  
This  b a t t l e  a t  Laswarr ie  Sheppard d e s c r i b e s  as " . , . t h e  mos t ,ho t ly  con- 
t e s t e d  and despe ra t e  b a t t l e  h i t h e r t o  recorded i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  of our  
army i n  Ind ia .  1128 
The war was extended when one Mahratra ch i e f  dec lared  a g a i n s t  
t h e  B r i t i s h  independent ly.  The t o t a l  B r i t i s h  i n  c h i s  a c t i o n  was 45,000 
a g a i n s t  a  t o t a l  Ind ian  of 50,000. B r i t l s h  v i c t o r i e s  were gained and 
many guns captured ,  b u t  only wi th  seve re  l o s s e s ,  
A t h i r d  and f i n a l  war was p r e c i p i t a t e d  i n  1817, wi th  a  g r e a t  
i n c r e a s e  i n  t roop  s t r e n g t h .  A t o t a l  of 180,000 Mahrat tas  and 30,000 
P i n d a r i s  jo ined  i n  combat wi th  113,000 t o  120,000 B r i t i s h  wi th  300 
guns. This  was t h e  l a r g e s t  B r i t i s h  army y e t  t o  be  seen  i n  I n d i a  up 
t o  t h i s  time. These t o t a l  numbers were t h e  B r i t i s h  armies themselves 
( i nc lud ing  Sepoys) and n o t  B r i t i s h  armies p l u s  a l l i e s .  The unusual ly  
h igh  number of men involved i s  not  only a  r e s u l t  of French m i l i t a r y  
s k i l l s  l earned  by t h e  Mahrat tas ,  bu t  a l s o  of t h e  immense c e r r i t o r y  
involved and t h e  p o l i c e  a c t i o n  t h i s  t e r r i t o r y  requi red .  
The Sikh wars provide  another  example of t h e  power of European 
m i l i t a r y  o rgan iza t ion ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when i t  i s  based upon a more c e n t r a l -  
i zed  p o l i t i c a l  system. Of t h e  t h r e e  European t r a i n e d  armies t h a t  t h e  
B r i t i s h  fought  i n  Ind ia  t h e  Sikhs were perhaps t h e  m o s t . f o ~ m i d a b l e .  29 
On a s c a l e  of a d a p t a b i l i t y  t o  European o rgan iza t ion ,  t h e  Sikhs a r e  on 
t h e  f a r  end. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  rhe  Sikh army enjoyed an advantage t h a t  t he  
Mahrat tas  and t h e  s t a t e  of Mysore d id  n o t  have, t i m e  t o  t r a i n  t h e i r  
fo rces .  
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The army of Ranjit Singh, the Punjab's most formidable general, 
began to train soldiers with European techniques as early as 1803, a 
full 42 years before the first confrontation with the English. The 
first influence of the.European organization was gained indirectly. 
. Deserters from the East.India Company, mainly Hindustani Muslims and 
a few Eurasians, were hired as drill sergeants. The exact number of 
these deserters is not known, but we know that there were enough to 
form a platoon.' Ranjit Singh also arranged to have Punjabis enter into 
the British armies and later report to him so that he might gain further 
knowledge of the British technique of organizing their army. A short 
campaign with this newly organized force against a rebellious chieftan 
showed the decided advantage of such training. As a consequence, in 
t 
1804, the British method of training and warfare was adopted on a 
larger scale. 
3 0 
The first European was hired in 1809, but it was not until 1822 
that any Europeans,of consequence joined the Sikh force. Two French 
officers, who had served under Napoleon, became generals in command of 
large portions of Ranjit's army. By 1822 there was a total of over 
fifty Europeans of a11 nationalities in the Service of the Sikh army. 
It also possessed a gun foundry run by a Frenchman, which.by some 
accounts produced better guns than the ones in British possession. 
Ranjit Signh's interest in British organization even went to 
the extent that, when Lord Lake was in an area near the,Punjab, he 
disquised himself apd entered the British camp to see how the British 
trained themselves. He had an interview with General Lake himself. 
Ranjit's success iq militarily uniting the Punjab was for the most 
part due to his ability to reorganize his army in this British fashion. 
One author  d e s c r i b e s  an encounter  w i th  a  n a t i v e  enemy as fo l lows .  
"This b a t t l e  l a s t e d  only one day and t h e  Ghazis gained t h e  martyrdom 
they  sought;  t hey  were a r a b b l e  armed wi th  swords o r  s p e a r s  and had 
t o  contend w i t h  a . d i s c i p l i n e d  army equipped wi th  muskets and f i e l d  
b a t t e r i e s .  l t 3 1  The Sikhs a r e  a  par titularly a p p r o p r i a t e  example of 
t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of .European t r a i n i n g .  Unlike t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  Moghul 
army, t h e  S ikhs  would regroup themselves a f t e r . a  charge.  They were 
t h e  " d i s c i p l i n e d  t roops  who d iv ided ,  reassembled, charged and h a l t e d  
on a  s i n g l e  p a r t  i n  t u r n ,  This  is  what t h e  B r i t i s h  found t o  be s o  
devas t a t ing .  
I n  technology,  we f i n d  t h a t  t h e  Sikhs were comparable t o  t h e  
Mahrat tas .  The evidence shows t h a t  f o r  t h e  most p a r t  t h e  Sikh a r t i l l e r y  
equal led ,  i f  n o t  e x c e l l e d ,  t h e  B r i t i s h .  The Sikhs provide  no except ion  
t o  t h e  r u l e  t h a t  Ind ian  armies had weapons e q u i v a l e n t ,  o r  n e a r  equ iva l en t  
t o  t h e  B r i t i s h .  33 
It i s  a l s o  f a i r l y  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  European presence  inf luenced  t h e  
b a s i c  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  army. The Sikh army, l i k e  t h a t  of t h e  Mahrat ta  
p r i n c e  S indhia  mentioned e a r l i e r ,  was a  h igh ly  cohesive and co rpora t e  
body. With t h e  dea th  of R a n j i t  Singh, t h e  Punjab was sub jec t ed  t o  
s e v e r a l  y e a r s  of i n f e r n a l  d i s o r d e r .  But throughout t h e  i n t e r n a l  con- 
f l i c t s  i n  t h e  pa l ace ,  t h e  one body t o  emerge a s  a  c e n t r a l  a u t h o r i t y  
was t h e  army. The Lahore s t a t e  was transformed i n t o  a  m i l i t a r y  s t a t e  
by a . p r o c e s s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  government of Imper ia l  Rome. I n s t e a d  of 
f r a c t i o n a t i n g  a s  a  t r a d i t i o n a l  army would, t h e  Sikh army maintained 
i t s e l f  a s  an o rgan iza t ion .  
Here i t  i s  apparent  t h a t  t h e  e a r l y  t ime a t  which t h e  Europeaniza- 
t i o n  of t h e  Sikh army began, t h e  in f luence  of many.European o f f i c e r s  of 
high quality, and a previously highly centralized political system 
produced in .the'Sikh- force a most- formidable opponent of-the British. 
A brief accounf of'the course of-the.two Sikh wars shows how formidable 
a foe they were. 
The army of the.Si-khs in.the First.Sikh War (1895-1896) .was 
well equipped,-with a- total of 50,000 men'and 100 guns, against a . - 
total British force o6 about 41,000 men. The ratio of total numbers 
involved is almost 'one to one. 
. . . ( _  
Mudke ~ritish 11,000 to 12,000 Sikhs a detachment "of little 
. . . . .  . . 
(or Moodkee) more than its own (British) 
strength" 
Ferozashah ~ritish 16,000 Sikhs 25,000 
63 guns 70 guns 
Sabraon British 15,000 Sikhs~20,OOO 
Each of these battles was hard fought and both sides suffered severe 
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losses. But in all battles the British drove their opponents from the 
. . . .  - . ,. . . . . . .  . . .  . - . . - . . . . , . i .  
field. 
The course of the Second Sikh War in 1848 wasmuch the same 
.:.: . . . . . .  . .- . .  , . . . 
except that the British lack of heavy artillery was corrected. This 
tipped the balance and "the power of the Sikhs was broken; and the 
Punjab was annexed to the British empire after the hardest fighting 
ever known to the British in India. 1134 
If indeed the numbers of men involved in a conflict and the 
. . .  
combatant ratio are indicative of the severity of the conflict and thus 
. . 
the effectiveness of the native military organization, then the war 
that involved the greatest numbers of men and the smallest combatant 
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ratio would indicate the most formidable of the British enemies. This 
enemy would be the army that was most effectively organized and trained 
on European lines, This is certainly true to a degree of the Sikhs, 
but it is also true'of another group. It should come as no surprise 
that the largest, British army to have ever been assembled in India, 
120,000 men, 38,OO.O of which were Europeans, fought against their own 
British Sepoys in the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857. The difficulties of 
this war, as to be expected, were immense. There was a total of nine 
major conflicts and innumerable minor battles. We can forego a descrip- 
tion of this well-known conflict except to mention that at the war's 
major battle, the siege of Delhi, the British losses were 40% of their 
total force. This should give an indication of the severity of the war. 
b , .  
The conquest of Southeast Asia displays many of the patterns 
I .  
witnessed in South Asia. The early inroads, confined to ports, were 
achieved by' superior European maritime technology. Land 'conquest 
shifted the demands to those of superior organization. The course of 
land conquest began with relatively easy European victories achieved 
by small forces in.the face of much larger native armies. As the 
course of land conquest proceeded, larger European forces were required 
and the combatant .ratios shifted toward unity, though for reasons 
different from those in India. Internal political difficulties in the 
native states often gave advantage and stimulus to European conquest. 
Everywhere the situation and the terrain imposed their own specific 
demands, producing a pattern broadly similar to that of South Asia but 
also filled with rich and dif ferentiating detail. 
Three .Burmese wars signalled the large scale British land 
conquest of Southeast Asia. The first war began with border disputes 
in 1823 and a Burmese attack on Chittagong, part.of British Bengal. 
A British seaborne expedition of 10,000 croops occupied a near deserted 
Rangoon in May 1824.~~ A series of small sallies showed the great 
military superiority of the British. By October, however, British 
ranks were greatly reduced by disease, and a force of only 1,300 could 
be mustered to defend against the 30,000 Burmese besieging the city. 
By December the Burmese numbered 60,000. Six days of.fighting were 
nonetheless sufficient to drive the Burmese from the field. 
Two overland expeditions were launched on the capital at Ava. 
Both ended in disaster as jungle and disease made impossible the 
large land-mass marching and fighting to which the British were 
accustomed in India. Advances were made up river by a force of 3,900 
and Prome was taken in April 1825. A cholera epidemic and a temporary 
truce altered the combatant ratio somewhat and later that year 40,000 
Burmese troops attacked the small British force at Prome. A British 
counterattack drove the Burmese from the field. Another British 
advance toward Ava brought the Burmese to surrender, marked by the 
treaty of Yandabo in early 1826. 
The course of the Second Burmese War (1852-1853) was much the 
same, although in this war the ease with which the British defeated 
the Burmese was even more remarkable. Burmese opposition in Rangoon 
numbered some 20,000 but were easily swept from their positions by 
5,700 British. One thousand British were then transported up river 
where another victory was easily effected in one day against a Burmese 
force of about 7,000.. Pegu and Prome were occupied with no resistance. 
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Later the Brirish were reinforced by 14,000 men for the main push up 
the river, Five hundred British troops left to hold Pegu were attacked 
and held out for three weeks against 11,000 Burmese before reinforce- 
ments came to drive off the besiegers. After many small guerilla type 
activities, the war for the most part was ended by April, 1853. In 
general the entire campaign was won with very llttle fighting and against 
enormous odds. 
The first part of the Third Burma War (1885) was much like the 
first wars.. War was declared in November 1885. 12,000 men were dis- 
patched and two months later the operations were complete with the fall 
of the capital and the surrender of the king. The war was not over, 
however. Many parts of the Burmese army ~efused to surrender and con- 
tinued guerilla activities. Now, against relatively small numbers of 
Burmese the British were forced to field between 30,000 and 40,000 
troops. 36 Even here, however, organizational superiority ultimately 
proved decisive. The capacity of the British to organize operations 
in a highly decentralized and flexible manner allowed them to prosecute 
the guerilla war successfully. The operation of pacification was 
carried out by small units of 100 to 1,000 troops, 
Again technology alone does not appear as a critical variable. 
The Burmese suffered no disadvantage from lack of military hardware. 
They were "...well armed especially with artillery, skilled in the 
rapid erection of stockades and rifle-pits for shelter against the 
hostile fire and to impede [the enemy's] progress, practiced in the 
handling of their war-canoes an$ fire-boats, and supremely confident 
in their own prowess... 1137 Other sources are more specific about 
Burmese military hardware. A colonel who fought in the Second Burmese 
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War wrote  t h a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  c i t a d e l  of Rangoon was defended by t h r e e  
18 pounder cannons and t h e  rest from 6 t o  12 pounders. . I n . a l l  he 
considered " . . . there  might be  f o r t y  p i eces  of ordinance a t  Rangoon." 
Laur ie  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s  r epo r t ed ,  "Some e x c e l l e n t  guns were found 
of i r o n  and b r a s s ;  two of t h e  la t ter  kind w e r e  deemed handsome enough 
af te rwards  t o  be  s e n t  t o  Calcutta. . . ' !  General Godwin is  s a i d . t o  have 
captured a  t o t a l  of 98 guns and 70 jungals .  The same can be s a i d  f o r  
t h e  sma l l e r  arms. Laur ie  s ays  t h a t  dur ing  t h e  advance of a p a r t y  of 
B r i t i s h  i n  one b a c t l e ,  " . . , t h e  muskecry was s o  s t eady  and e f f e c t i v e  
from t h e  s tockades .and  ad jo in ing  bu i ld ings ,  t h a t  a  g r e a t  many of our  
p a r t y  were k i l l e d  and wounded..." He a l s o  main ta ins  t h a t ,  "Their 
i n f a n t r y  equipments were ' t o l e r a b l y  complete"'. 3  8  
F i n a l l y ,  we s e e  t h e  same s h i f t  i n  combatant r a t i o s  observed 
i n  t h e  Mysore war and Mahrat ta  wars i n  Ind ia .  But i n  Burma i t  was no t  
t h e  adoption of European o rgan iza t iona l  p a t t e r n s  t h a t  produced t h e  
change. It w a s  r a t h e r  a combination of t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t h e  t e r r a i n  
and even tua l ly  t h e  h igh  c o s t s  of producing o r d e r  by f o r c e  a lone .  
A s  t h e  B r i t i s h  i n  I n d i a ,  t h e  Dutch i n  Java  began wi th  a  smal l  
c o a s t a l  f a c t o r y  o r i e n t e d  toward (armed) t r a d e  and p ro t ec t ed  by a  
powerful f l e e t .  39 I n  1619 when t h e  Dutch founded Batavia ,  Su l t an  
Agung of Matram (1613-45) .was uni fy ing  Java.  P a r t  of t h e  u n i f i c a t i o n  
involved t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  independent n o r t h  c o a s t  t r a d i n g  s t a t e s  
( p a s i s i r ) .  I n  t h i s  t h e  Dutch only too  happ i ly  provided nava l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  
wi th  t h e  aim of monopolizing t r a d e  themselves. 
A s u p e r i o r  mari t ime technology thus  provided t h e  f i r s t  inroad.  
The Dutch f a c t o r y  a t  Batav ia  c o n s t i t u t e d  only  a foothold  t o l e r a t e d  by 
t h e  powerful land-based Su l t an  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  t r i b u t e  and nava l  a s s i s t a n c e .  
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An a t tempt  t o  d i s lodge  ~ h e  Dutch i n  1628 provided t h e  Su l t an  wi th  much 
t h e  same le s son  Akbar had learned  about t h e  Portugese a t  Diu h a l f  a  
century  e a r l i e r ,  A Matram f o r c e  of perhaps 10,000 besieged Batavla ,  
defended by l e s s  than  3,000. Bur t h e  Matram b e s i e g e r s  had t o  be 
suppl ied  by s e a  and t h e  Dutch f l e e t  destroyed two hundred v e s s e l s  of . 
r i c e  des t ined  f o r  the  S u l t a n ' s  t roops.  The s t a r v i n g  b e s i e g e r s  were 
forced  t o  withdraw a f t e r  f i v e  weeks. 
The Dutch f l e e t  could secure  t h e  p o r t ,  bu t  could n o t  a s s i s t  
i n  land c o n t r o l ,  however, Thus the  power of Mat~am and t h e  more 
s t r i c t l y  commercial i n c e r e s t s  of t h e  Dutch kep t  t h e  l a t t e r  confined t o  
Batavia  f o r  about h a l f  a  century .  The d e c l i n e  of Matram power toward 
t h e  end of t h e . 1 7 t h  century  forced  t h e  Dutch t o  acqu i r e  g r e a t e r  c o n t r o l  
over  land ,  and by t h e  middle of the  1 8 t h  cen tu ry  they  were i n  e f f e c t  
p o l i t i c a l  r u l e r s  of Java.  Here Dutch o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s u p e r i o r i t y  proved 
dec i s ive .  From 1619 t o  1823 some 22 c o n f l i c t s  are recorded,  w i th  t h e  
combatant r a t i o s  we have seen  elsewhere where Europeans f a c e  n a t i v e  
armies.  Dutch f o r c e s  v a r i e d  from 1,000 t o  7,500; Javanese from 3,000 
t o  11,000, though evidence of numbers i s  much less secu re  than  f o r  Ind ia .  
Expedi t ions were u s u a l l y  s h o r t  and v i c t o r i e s  r e l a t i v e l y  easy.  Normally 
more t roops  were l o s r  t o  d i s e a s e  than i n  b a t t l e .  
The Java  War of 1825 i l l u s t r a t e s  a  new t u r n  i n  t h e  European 
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  s u p e r i o r i t y .  The war was a  popular  u p r i s i n g  l e d  by a  
d i s s i d e n t  p r i n c e  f r u s t r a t e d  i n  h i s  ambit ions f o r  power. A s  a  popular  
u p r i s i n g ,  it showed more t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of a  modem g u e r i l l a  war 
than  of t h e  massed b a t t l e s  of India .  A t  f i r s t  t h e  Dutch met t h e  
contenders  i n  t y p i c a l  m i l f t a r y  fash ion ,  I n  i t s  e a r l y  s t a g e s  rhe  war 
cons i s t ed  of a s e r i e s  of wearisome and i n d e c i s i v e  marches. When t h e  
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~utch forces approached, hostile mobs dispersed before a hand to hand 
engagement could take place and then reassembled again at anocher point 
to harrass the foreign rulers, 
To meec this new situation, rhe Dutch reorganized their opera- 
tions into the Bentengsrelsel system, This was essentially a decentral- 
ization of operacions, creating ten auronomous flying columns, each 
conraining its own infanrry, artillery, cavalry, engineers and ambulance. 
Bentengs, or fortified outposts, were used to consolidate territory 
secured by concentric operacions of rhe columns. Column commanders had 
a &at deal of auconomy and could exercise initiative independently, 
though each was also to maintain contact and to collaborate.with other 
columns. All columns were to be operating continuously.between the 
Bentengs to p.rovide an omnipresence to deter guerilla efforts. Pacifi- 
cation was -achieved with this decentralized organization, though the 
costs were high. 
The next major conflict for the Dutch was the Atche War, from 
1873-1900. The first expedition brou@t 3,600 Dutch troops to Sumatra; 
the second required twice this number to capture the Kraton, the capital 
and princely residence. Although the Dutch expected this Lo end the 
war; it merely shifted it to ics next, guerilla, phase, This phase was 
made more difficult for the Dutch because the Atchenes were politically 
organized in a fede.ration and the ruler had no real power to command 
local chiefs co surrender, even if he had wished to. Thus the Dutch 
had to use their highly decent.ralized military operation against a 
number of individual power centers. The war was long and costly. The 
largest number of Dutch forces engaged at any time was 11,000, but the 
total number required over the quarter century of war was many times 
t h a t .  The count:ry was n o t  f u l l y  p a c i f i e d  u n t i l  1904, though l a r g e  
s c a l e  ope ra t ions  ceased by 1900. 
The French wars i n  Southeast  Asi.a began later and moved more 
quick ly  chrough t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  pa t t e rn .40  I n  1860 t h e  p o r t s  of 
Saigon and Tourane (Danang) were sefzed .  French nava l  s u p e r i o r i t y  
could no t  e f f e c t  an easy  v i c t o r y ,  however, a g a f n s c - t h e  determined 
r e s i s t a n c e  of t h e  Vietnamese. Nonetheless t h e  nava l  supremacy d i d  
prove d e c i s i v e  and France began, more by diplomacy and t h r e a t  than  by 
a c t u a l  combat t o  a c q u i r e  land  con t ro l  through southern  Vietnam, 
Cambodia and-Laos.  The t h r e a t s  were h ighly  e f f e c t i v e  l a r g e l y  because 
t h e  new steam-powered n a v a l  technology was concurren t ly  des t roy ing  
t r a d i t i o n a l  n a t i v e  r u l e  throughout Southeast  Asia .  
I n  t h e  next  decade t h e  French curned t h e i r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
Red River  d e l t a  and used t h e i r  nava l  supremacy, w i th  an unbel ievably  
smal l  f o r c e ,  t o  t ake  t h e  c i t a d e l  a t  Hanoi i n  1875. A t o t a l  of 212 
t roops ,  of which 188 were French, proved s u f f i c i e n t .  The diplomacy 
d of o f f e r i n g  p r o t e c t i o n  over  t h e  t h i n  v e i l  of a nava l  t h r e a t  by which 
.; . . ,., 
Cambodia was ' taken was noc f u l l y  succes s fu l  i n  Tonkin, however, and 
t h e  French had t o  u se  a , s t r o n g  f o r c e  t o  ga in  land  c o n t r o l .  Against 
t h e  more powerful ly  organized  Vietnamese, t h e  French had t o  f i e l d  a 
f o r c e  of 17,000 i o  d e f e a t  an est imated 25,000 i n  t h e  Tonkin War i n  
1882. Here bo th  modern m i l i c a r y  technology and European m i l i t a r y  
o rgan iza t ion  brought v i c t o r y  t o  t h e  French. 
We have seen  how a combination of t echno log ica l  and organiza-  
t i o n a l  s u p e r i o r i t y  c a r r i e d  t h e  European conquest of Southern Asia.  
The f i r s t  i n roads  came through t h e  overwhelming s u p e r i o r i t y  of t h e  
maritime technology. But t h i s  technolpgica l  s u p e r i o r i t y  s e w e d  a t  
first only co provide control over a network of sea lanes and ports. 
Control over land required organizational as well as technological 
superiority. Asian rulers could, and did, o'btain.the gun technology 
developed by the West, though they were always at the distinct.hlstor- 
ical disadvantage of latecomers who lack the larger organizational 
base to match.the innovators. On the battlefield i't was the organi- 
zational innovation of a bureaucratically arranged army that proved 
decisive. The capacity to move large numbers of men and supplies 
quickly over long distances, to concentrate the power of numbers on 
small targets and.to redirect that concentration to other targets, 
to coordinate diverse individuals.and specialized units to gain the 
concerted movement of masses of energy, these were the fruits of 
European organizational superiority in the field. Further, the rational 
orientation of the military enabled specific organizational patterns to 
be altered to fit new conditions. European supremacy depended upon the 
ability to &concentrate, to decentralize, as well as to centralize, 
as the British in upper Burma and the Dutch in Java show so well. 41 
Where Asian rulers failed to develop this rational organiza- 
tional pattern they could be defeated by inferior numbers, despfte 
acquisition of the gun.technology. Where they managed to copy the 
western organizationa1,patterns they forced the conquerors to meet 
them.in the field with equal numbers. Thus the microcosm of the 
battlefield provides dramatic evidence of the importance of the 
mode..m organizational patterns in the conquest of Asia. 
One additional aspect of.this microcosmic change deserves 9 
mention. Modem military operations are distinguished from more 
traditional operations by the increasing impersonalization of combat. 
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Bureaucratic arrangements essentially depersonalize operations, sub- 
stituting rules administered by technically qualified officials for 
the personal decisions of an ascriptively qualified elite, Thus 
the military supremacy displayed by European tr.oops against superior 
numbers of brave.and individually skillful native horsemen was the 
supremacy of the bureaucrat-technician over rhe hero. Heroic armies 
have seldom been a march for bureaucratic armies. One might,even 
see the history of warfare as a continuous replacemenc of heroes with. 
bureaucrat-technicians. Each replacement is marked by scorn, resis- 
tance and the double injury of defeat at the hands of "inferior" 
forces. The heroic French knight knew only scorn for the armed and 
drilled burghers of Lyon who scafned knightly honor with their vic- 
tory. Abyssinian heroic warriors under Teodoros scorned the Ottoman 
\ 
armies in Egypt, whose.men marched about like ants, but Teodoros 
nonetheless attempted- to imitate this ant-lfke force, and Menilik's 
success in the imitation brought him victory against the Italians in 
1895. Similarly the World War I ace- fighter pilot, who could shake 
his fist visibly at his opponent might decry.the high-flying, computer- 
operated bombers that pe.mit crews to "do their.jobH of destruction 
against a foe they could not.even see. Yet no amount of heroism 
seems capable, in the past or the present, of stemming the tide of 
This microcosmfc arena has its parallel in the macrocosmic 
arena. The maritime and gun technology and the organization of the 
army grew out of and depended upon innovations in the larger 
pattern.of social organization, In the history of western Europe 
- 33 - 
the rise of the modern state, with its centralized administrative 
apparatus, is inextricably linked with the rise of modem bureaucrat- 
ically organized armies and navies. Just as heroes have been replaced 
on the battlefield by bureaucrat-technicians, che modem state has been 
replaced personal rulers with trained bureaucrats and has gained 
immense power thereby. 
The modern state has proved to be a formidable mechanism for 
mobilizing resources. Through coercion, compensation, and the ideo- 
logical fervor of national identity the state has been able to draw 
together for concerted action a staggering number of disparate indi- 
viduals and groups. It was the power of this mobilizing force of 
the state that permitted Europeans to overwhelm the more traditional 
patrimonial authority systems of Asia. Thus in the macrocosm of the 
emergence.of the nation state we see parallel evidence of the impor- 
tance of modern organizational forces in the conquest of Asia. 
Just as Asian rulers could imitate the gun technology of the 
west, and with greater difficulty adopt some of the organizational 
patterns of the modern military on the battlefield, Asian peoples 
have also acquired the modern state-like organizational patterns. 
Asian rulers with guns were more formidable than those with spears 
and swords; Asian rulers with Europeanized armies were more formid- 
able than those with traditfonal heroic armies; and more recently 
Asian peoples mobilized through nation-state arrangements have been. 
more formidable than those mobilized by traditional patrimonial 
arrangements. It is this parallel of microcosmic and macrocosmic 
development that is reflected in the dramatic reversals of combatant 
ratios observed at the outset of this essay. 
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The first of the major nationalist wars in Asia occurred in 
the Philippines at the close of the 19th Spanish colonialism 
had produced both the admfnlseratfve and ideological underpinnings of a 
major nationalist movement. The Filipinos were successful in their 
armed rebellion againsr Spain, partly, to be sure, because the United 
States destroyed Spanish naval power in Manila Bay. Bur the next two 
years of warfare demonstrared that the Filipinos had also acquired a 
pattern of social organization that gave chem great capacities for 
resource mobilization. The cabinet of Aquinaldo was that of a 
modern government, mobilizing an allegiance that no traditional sultan 
or prince could have mustered. It was capable of fielding a force of 
some 40,000, supported by powerful national sentiments. American 
forces, with their overwhelming technological superiority had to 
maintain twice thar number over two bitter years of fighting to gain 
control of the Philippines. 
It would be half a century afrer rhe Philippines national 
war before the full epidemic of national liberation took hold deci- 
sively in Asia. Again, external forces played a crucial role. Just 
as western imperialism and colonialism had produced the administrative 
and ideological underpinnings of Asian nationalism, World War I1 
producedrthe catalyst that galvanized these movements into armed 
independence struggles. In  world War I1 the Japanese produced some- 
thing of their own reversal of the combatanr ratios by which the 
West conquered Asia. With superior organization the Japanese took 
Southeast Asia, sometimes, as at Singapore, in the face of numerictilly 
superior forces. 
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The defeat of.the Japanese br,ought to Asia,a greater concen- 
tration of Western military p0we.r than had ever been experienced. In 
India, Burma, the Philippines and Malaysia this power was not directed 
at regaining land control and independence was gained in part with the. 
assistance and acquiescence of the imperial powers. In Indonesia and 
Indochina, however, Western.military power was directed at .reestablishing 
land contr.01. And in both cases ir was decisively defeated. 43 Between 
1945 and 1950 120,000 Dutch.troops could not maintain a presence in 
Indonesia. One hundred thousand French troops were driven from North 
Vietnam by 1954, and half a million American troops were insufficient 
to maintain land control in South Vietnam, In all of these cases the 
West maintained a technological supremacy, sometimes of awful propor- 
eions. But the West had lost its organizational superiority and with 
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